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Abstract 
In 2015 the federal government announced the largest data breach in United States 
government history. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was hacked, and the personal 
information of more than 25 million American people was lost to foreign attackers. This incident 
has spawned concern and outrage about the security of government data in the emerging digital 
age. 
Moving forward from the breach questions remain about how this event happened. It' s 
clear that there were weaknesses that were taken advantage of by malicious threats abroad, and 
investigations into the attack have yielded surprising results. Not only was the security in place at 
OPM insufficient, this fact had been known for years leading up to the breach. Along with the 
agency, third-party contractors working with the agency and the federal government contributed 
to the weak security controls that allowed this calamity to occur. 
With cyber security moving to the forefront of the American public's mind, it is 
important to understand what has been done to shore up the defenses in place to protect federal 
data since the attack, and what can be done in the future to prevent attacks like this to from being 
successful in the future. Cybersecurity will be increasingly important for the government to 
address as hackers and other militant groups gain access to better hacking technology. 
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Final Written Product- 7,073 words 
As the world progresses into the digital age, more and more information is being moved 
online. The security of secret files and documents has changed from locked doors and filing 
cabinets to complex cyber security that most people don' t understand. The threat to the privacy 
of government data may be more real now than ever before as hackers are able to access remote 
information from the safety of unknown locations all across the world. These hackers are 
becoming more sophisticated, and people are reminded of the dangers they pose by their 
successful attempts to steal private data. Perhaps the most forceful reminder of recent times was 
the announcement by the United States government of the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) data breach. This data breach was the first major breach of a government system. While 
there have been multiple private sector breaches involving millions of people, this was the first to 
challenge the federal government. There are still many questions and fears about the implications 
of the data breach involving federal data. In order to better understand the threats to sensitive 
federal data, it is important to understand what occurred in the OPM data breach, what enable the 
breach to take place, and what can be done to prevent such breaches in the future. 
Although cyber crime is becoming more commonplace everyday, the jargon that 
accompanies this type of crime is often difficult to understand. In order to better understand the 
following account of the OPM data breach, it is important to identify some common 
technological meanings. In cybersecurity when a malicious attempt is made to access a computer 
network, it is known as an attack. If the attack is successful in penetrating the network defenses, 
it becomes known as an intrusion. In an intrusion, the hacker has access to information within the 
network, but hasn ' t modified or removed any information. If the attacker is able to modify 
information or remove it from the network, the intrusion becomes known as a breach. The role of 
cybersecurity is to identify and stop these attacks as soon as possible. 
Literature Review 
Cybersecurity has become an increasingly important research topic over the past ten 
years as more organizations move their information into digital format. As more information 
moves online, securing data becomes a major concern. Many researchers insist that IT security is 
underfunded, and that this underfunding will lead to problems down the road if action isn' t taken 
to secure data systems. 1 Forethought will be required of organizational leaders in order to defend 
their secure information from prying eyes. 
One of the issues with cybersecurity is that it is so difficult to understand . Because 
managers and investors aren ' t able to understand the highly technical language of cybersecurity , 
it is difficult to prioritize installment and maintenance of secure systems.2 Those that understand 
securing their private data will be those that are successful in the future . 
As security is installed, many managers make the mistake of assuming that all hacking 
attempts can be deterred by a strong enough security system. Layers of security were 
incorporated into data systems, each building on the other. Now research points to that fact that 
no matter the number of layers, data systems will experience breaches. The focus must turn to 
1 North, James, and Richard Pascoe. 2016. 11 Cyber security and resilience -- it's all about 2 Dobrian, Joseph. 2015. 11 Are You Sitting on a Cyber Security Bombshell?. 11 Journal Of Property 
Management 80, no. 5: 8-11. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost(accessed May 5, 2016). 
2 
mitigation and elimination of malicious traffic on organization systems. 3 This is a crucial turning 
point for cybersecurity as a practice. 
Many researchers have tried to assess the results of data breaches. There are attempts to 
analyze the results in order to help IT officials and managers decide how to allocate funds to 
cybersecurity. Researchers such as Ginger Davis, Alfredo Garcia, and Weide Zhang try to 
quantify the costs of breaches in order to use a mathematical approach to resource allocation in 
IT budgets. 4 
The 2015 data breach of the US Government Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) highlights the importance of this research. This project will attempt to shed light 
on the nature of the OPM data breach and will assess to what extent the challenges 
identified in the literature are relevant to the understanding of the OPM problem and its 
potential solution. 
Research Methodology 
Much of the research builds upon the internship completed by the author with VMware 
during the summer of 2015. VMware is an information technology company that aims to help 
data systems create better security controls. This knowledge provided a factual background for 
the capstone project and informed much of the discussion of the research. 
3 Densham, Ben. "Three Cyber-security Strategies to Mitigate the Impact of a Data Breach." 
Network Security 2015, no. l (January 27, 2015): 5-8 . doi: l 0.1016/s l 353-4858(15)70007-3. 4 
Davis, Ginger, Alfredo Garcia, and Weide Zhang. 2009. "Empirical Analysis of the Effects of 
Cyber Security Incidents." Risk Analysis: An International Journal 29, no. 9: 1304-
1316.SPORTDiscus with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed May 5, 2016). 
3 
Due to the relative dearth of scholarly articles on the OPM data breach, the data for this 
research comes primarily from individual testimonies before congressional hearings in both the 
Senate and the House in the summer of 2015. The House Committee of Oversight and 
Government Reform along with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs and Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government held hearings on the 
OPM data breach. Transcripts of the numerous hearings about the breach provide insight from 
experts closest to the federal investigation that took place into the event. Along with verbal 
testimony, experts' submitted written testimony expounds upon some of the more technological 
issues surrounding this particular breach. 
The Series of OPM Data Breaches 
In June of 2015 the public learned that OPM had suffered one of the most severe 
breaches of government data in history. Reports stated that hackers had infiltrated the OPM 
network and taken the personal information of millions of current and former employees. 
Although initial estimates put the number of affected persons at 4-5 million that number 
continued to grow until it reached more than 21 million current and former employees as well as 
applicants for federal positions. The information taken ranged from social security numbers and 
addresses to intimate background checks and fingerprints. The security of confidential federal 
question came severely under question. 
As more details began to come to light, government agency officials were called to testify 
before Congress. A tenuous timeline of events began to unfold that made it clear that the OPM 
data breach was much more than a one-time successful attack on a government agency. The 
OPM data breach was in fact a series of data intrusions and breaches dating back at least two 
4 
years. The timeline of events that fall under the umbrella of the OPM data breach is given below 
in chronological order of discovery date. Understanding the series of events and how they are 
connected is a crucial part of understanding how to secure federal data in the future. 
The First OPM Data Breach 
The first chronologically relevant incident to the OPM breach is an intrusion detected in 
March of 2014. This intrusion was detected as result of interagency cooperation between DHS 
and OPM. DHS is responsible for assisting agencies that suffer successful cyber attacks. 
Investigation into the intrusion revealed foreign activity on the OPM network as far back as 
November 2013.5 During this time, the hackers did not have full access to the OPM network, but 
they did have access to some documents. Among those documents were manuals about the OPM 
systems. These manuals were taken at this time. 
In a hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Ms. 
Donna Seymour, Chief information Officer (CIO) of OPM, described the manuals taken as 
" [m]anuals about the servers and the environment." When pressed if these manuals could serve 
as a blueprint for the OPM network, she responded, " It would be fair to say that they would give 
you enough information that you could learn about the platform, the infrastructure of our 
system."6 It is not known how much of a role the information acquired in this first breach played 
in further attacks on the OPM system. 
It is important to understand that OPM employs several third-party contractors to assist 
with background checks and other agency operations. Due to their involvement with OPM, these 
contractors have access to the agency systems. Two contractors in particular, USIS and Keypoint 
5 htt s:// fcw.com/articles/2_QJ5/08/2 l/opm-breach-timeline.as Jx?m= l 6 OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015). 
5 
Government Solutions, are of particular interest to the OPM data breach because malicious 
activity and breaches were discovered on their networks after the initial OPM breach.7 
The USIS Data Breach 
The first breach of third-party systems detected was in USIS systems. USIS notified their 
contracting agency, OPM, of a breach of data on the USIS network. This breach was later 
discovered to date back as far as April 2013. 8 At this time some personally identifiable 
info1mation (PII) was removed from the contracting company's system. At 2,600 individuals ' PII 
was taken in this breach. USIS was not only a contractor with OPM, but they contracted with 
DHS as well. Hackers in this breach extracted no DHS information. 
USIS notified OPM and acknowledged the breach of its system in August 2014. This 
breach of USIS systems was initially considered to be a separate incident, but was later ruled to 
be in connection with the earlier OPM breach. OP suspended work with USIS in August, and 
contracts with USIS were not renewed after their expiration. 9 
The Keypoint Data Breaches 
As part of the response after OPM was notified of the USIS breach, officials from the 
U.S. Computer Readiness Team scanned the networks of both Keypoint and USIS. These scans 
revealed two distinct breaches in the Keypoint systems. 10 
7 ibid 
8 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
9 Sternstein, Aliya, and Jack Moore. "Timeline: What We Know About the OPM Breach." 





During the first Keypoint breach, hackers gained access to more that 400,000 federal 
employees' and contractors ' PII. Investigators claim there is no conclusive evidence that the PII 
was actually removed from Keypoint servers at this time, and the public was not notified until 
June 2015. It is further believed that the attackers gained access to Keypoint systems some time 
in December 2013 .11 This gives the hackers ample time to navigate throughout the Keypoint 
system. 
A second Keypoint breach took place seemingly concurrently with the first, but 
investigators insist that the two series of malicious activity are separate attacks. Similarly to the 
first discovered OPM breach, the hackers removed data from Keypoint that could assist in future 
attacks against OPM networks . This time the hackers were able to secure a set of employee 
credentials from the Keypoint network. These credentials provided access to the OPM system 
and were later acknowledged by OPM Director Katherine Archuleta to have been used in future 
OPM breaches. 12 Ms. Archuleta commended Keypoint for their cooperation with federal security 
investigators and assured the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee that 
Keypoint had implemented all suggested remediation efforts . Keypoint is continues contractual 
relations with the federal government through OPM.13 
The Second OPM Data Breaches 
The previous four breaches of OPM data excited relatively little governmental or public 
concern over the security of federal data. The real panic began in April of 2015 with the 
discovery of the two largest data breaches. As OPM was updating security across its networks, a 
11 ibid 
12 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 




foreign presence was detected within the systems. Upon discovery of this intrusion, DHS worked 
with OPM to perform an in depth scan of networks housing OPM data and discovered another 
breach in the Department of Interior (DOI) data center. 14 
Although the DOI breach was discovered after the second OPM breach, details about the 
DOI breach came forth more quickly. DOI was storing OPM records in their data center, and 
diagnostic revealed with a "high confidence" that 4.2 million records had been removed by 
hackers. Just as in previous breaches, this information was comprised of information about 
employees past and present as well as applicants for government positions. Investigators 
determined that hackers successfully gained access to the DOI network in October of2014. 15 
Results of investigations into the OPM data breach that led to the DOI breach discovery 
yielded even worse results . Just months after the first OPM breach was detected and expelled 
from the system, hackers gained access to OPM servers once again. This activity began in May 
2014 and continued for more than a year until the April 2015 discovery. Experts claim that 
security updates on the OPM network incapacitated the breach in January 2015, but detection of 
the foreign activity didn't take place until further security updates in April. Hackers were most 
active within the network between June 2014 and January 2015 when new security disabled their 
ability to access further data. 16 
The second OPM data breach was by far the largest and most concerning. Investigations 
revealed that any persons that had a federal background check from 2000 until the time the 
breach was stopped are "highly likely" to have been impacted by the event. The OPM website 





sets of fingerprints, and usernames and passwords used by government applicants to complete 
employment forms. 17 A senate hearing further revealed that among the information obtained by 
the hackers were SF-86 forms. This personnel form requires intimate details about applicants and 
employees such as mental health history, past employment, social security number, previous 
residences, and details about family members. 18 Forms like the SF-86 led to the PII of 1.8 
million nonapplicants being taken in the breach along with the other data. OPM claims that there 
is no proof that health financial , and payroll records were obtained in the breach. 19 
The Aftermath 
In response to the series of breaches, notifications to affected persons have been sent out 
intermittently. The final round of notifications began September 30, 2015 and was scheduled to 
continue for 12 weeks. OPM has called the Interior breach "the incident involving personnel 
data" and the April 2015 OPM breach "the background investigation incident."20 The agency is 
providing full service identity restoration and identity theft insurance to victims of either 
incident, but also continuous identity and credit monitoring for those affected by the background 
investigation incident.21 
17 "Cybersecurity Resource Center Cybersecurity Incidents." U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management. Accessed May 05, 2016. https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-
incidents/#WhatHappened. 
18 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
19 "Cybersecurity Resource Center Cybersecurity Incidents." U.S. Office of Personnel 





Although there were numerous reports that the hackers behind the OPM data breach were located 
in China, there has been no formal accusation made.22 In December the Washington Post 
reported that the Chinese government had arrested individuals connected to the OPM data 
breach, but some U.S. government officials were reluctant to admit that these were the actual 
hackers. The Chinese government has insisted that it did not play a role in the attacks. 23 
Not knowing the identity of the hackers makes it difficult to guess what the motive was in 
attacking OPM systems. There are concerns that the hackers may be able to compile a database 
of government employees in an attempt to target high level officials or some other form of 
espionage. Experts revealed in a Senate hearing that the hackers had the ability to modify 
employee background records including security clearance adjudication or derogatory comments. 
This is seen as highly unlikely, but the threat remains that there may have been tampering on the 
network. 24 There is any number of possible uses for the data that was removed from OPM and 
for attacking the agency's database. It remains to be seen what may result from this breach. 
Organizational Security Failures 
As investigations released more information on the series of breaches and they were 
slowly fit into a coherent timeline, it became obvious that there were numerous weakness and 
22 Barrett, Devlin, Danny Yadron, and Damian Paletta. "The Big Story Behind China's New 
Military Strategy - Congressman J. Randy Forbes." States News Service, June 5, 2015. Accessed 
2016. http:/ /www.highbeam.com/doc/1 G 1-416623199 .html ?refid=easy hf. 23 Nakashima, Ellen. "Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says Breached OPM 
Database." Washington Post. December 2, 2015. Accessed May 05, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-government-has-arrested-
hackers-suspected-of-breaching-opm-database/2015/12/02/0295b918-990c-l 1 e5-8917-
653b65c809eb _story .html. 
24 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
failures in the OPM security network. It is nearly impossible to entirely guarantee perfect 
security on any network, so organizations focus on two levels of security. The first level is 
prevention. They implement tools such as passwords and firewalls to keep threats from being 
able to access secure networks. The second level is timely identification of threats that do access 
the servers before they can remove or modify data on the servers. It can be seen from details of 
the OPM data breach that both the security of OPM servers and third-party contractors was 
insufficient and afforded attackers the opportunity to breach the system. 
Third-Party Contractors 
Prior to news breaking of the two largest OPM breaches, a hearing was held before the 
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about enhancing the 
cybersecurity of third party contractors and vendors. This hearing took place in late April of 
2015, and specifically addressed many of the issues surrounding the breaches of Keypoint and 
USIS networks containing sensitive government data. 
During the course of statements and testimony it became clear there were significant 
weaknesses in the infrastructure of security systems between contractors and agencies such as 
inconsistent notification procedure, ineffective contractual language, and poor network 
architecture. Contractors comprise a large component of federal security, as nearly one third of 
security personnel working across 24 agencies are contracted employees. Experts at the House 
Committee Hearing testified of three main weaknesses in the structure of contracting companies' 
security in relation to agency networks. 25 
25 Enhancing Cybersecurity of Third-Party Contractors and Vendors: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
11 
The first concern with contractor security was an inconsistent application of notification 
procedure for malicious activity. At the time agencies were not utilizing a standard set of 
procedures for when contractors must report malicious activity on their networks. Furthermore, 
when the contractors did report the activity, it was not to a uniform body . Information about 
rebuffed attacks and successful intrusions were not being reported to higher levels of federal 
security. This lack of information sharing allowed attackers to attempt intrusions into multiple 
systems with each system working to independently identify the threat. If threats are reported to 
higher agencies, information regarding attacks on other systems can be used to thwart the same 
attackers' attempts on new systems. 26 
This information sharing is similar to law enforcement sharing information about 
criminals in the physical world. Because cyber criminals are rarely apprehended, they are still 
able to attempt further attacks on different systems. If one agency reports to the others that there 
is a group of criminals driving a black van with license plate #112233, then other agencies are 
able to adjust their security to watch for the identified threat. This same principle works in 
cybersecurity. If one group can identify a threat and report it to other organizations and agencies, 
then they can adjust their systems to watch for similar threats. 
With greater information sharing, the federal government could compile an inclusive list 
of known threats and attackers that all contractors and agencies would be able to utilize in 
securing their networks. 
The second concern was that contractual language did not permit agencies to inspect and 
modify contractors' security systems. Many of the contractors were not in compliance with 
federal cybersecurity regulation, but agencies lacked the ability to inspect and modify security 
26 ibid 
12 
practices in use by the contractors. Different agencies will have different security needs, so it is 
not abnormal for contractors to implement different types of data security. Agencies, however, 
should be able to assess contractors' security systems to confirm that they will be adequate for 
their purpose. 27 
The third concern with contractor relationships with agencies was network infrastructure. 
There were a variety of approaches to how agencies built contractors into their networks. Some 
agencies allowed contractors nearly full access to their networks. This means that contractors 
were able to use laptops to connect directly into the agency network. Other agencies required 
their contractors to connect laptops to the company network before allowing access to the agency 
network. The latter construction provides another level of security for data contained in the 
networks. It is apparent that there was not standard for network architecture between contractors 
and agencies, and this is an exploitable weakness for hackers .28 
The credential that was removed from Keypoint in their second breach demonstrates at 
least in part the issues with network architecture. This credential allowed full access to the OPM 
network. Security measures were not able to detect the hostile presence because the credential 
gave the hackers the ability to move freely through the system with authorization and 
clearance.29 It was not until unusual activity was detected in connection that security 
administrators were able to realize that the credential was compromised. Better architecture can 
help to prevent lower level credentials from having significant access to secure systems. 
Mr. Tony Scott, the United State Chief Information Officer, took the lead at the hearing 





contractors working with government data. In response to the first concern about inconsistent 
security reporting, 0MB has led an effort to assemble and disseminate a set of best practices to 
agencies to help with efforts to strengthen federal security. These best practices should help to 
alleviate the stress the inconsistent responses and protocols currently place on security efforts for 
the federal network as a whole. 
Along with the effort of O MB to create a set of best practices for third party contractors, 
the agency has worked with the Federal CIO Council and the CAO Council to create 
recommendations for bolstering cybersecurity language in Federal contracts including three 
specific recommendations. First, formal guidance to implement new policy requirements. 
Second, updates to existing guidance or recommend inclusions in annual guidance documents . 
Third, facilitation of best practices sharing through existing interagency forums. With these 
formal recommendations in place and distributed to agencies, it is hoped that contractual 
language will require agencies to allow greater agency control in emergency or breach situations. 
This should also help the agencies inspect and modify contractor security measures if there are 
concerns that the security is insufficient. 
In response to poor network infrastructure between agencies and contractors, 0MB has 
worked with the CIO Council as well as the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in order to 
share information about contracting clauses. This has helped to develop clauses for federal 
contracts with vendors that strengthen the federal government's position and ability to monitor 
contractors' network architecture. These clauses will provide a framework for how network 
architecture should be constructed between agencies and third parties. 
As these concerns are addressed, it will help to improve the security of federal data, but it 
will not make it invincible. As it is clear that there is no cybersecurity silver bullet, a measure 
14 
that can prevent all malicious attacks, most of the measures taken are to help the federal 
government react to incidents with contractors. Contractors will still need to implement strong 
security measures, but these new policies will help the federal government more effectively 
control overall security of its data. It is clear that third party weaknesses played a role in some of 
the OPM breaches, but not all. This means that the federal systems themselves must be 
scrutinized in order to understand the weaknesses that are contained within their networks . 
OPM 
While there are many that blame the OPM data breach on the compromised credential 
taken from a third-party contractor, it is obvious from the timeline that this was not the only 
weakness exploited in the OPM data breach. OPM's own network was breached at least two 
times, and at least once before the credential was successfully acquired. The agency had been 
warned of substantial security weaknesses over years leading up to the incidents, and those 
weaknesses were eventually exploited to gain access to the network. 
Under the Federal Information Securities Act (FISMA), the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) is required to audit agency information technology (IT) security. Annual reports detail the 
chronology of deficiencies in OPM security systems as far back as FY2007. In that year OIG 
found and reported material weaknesses "related to the lack of security policies and procedures." 
These weaknesses were annually reported as a concern up to FY2014. 
From the annual reports it is clear that deficiencies were present in the OPM security 
systems for years prior to the breach. Dating back to FY2007 OIG found material weaknesses 
15 
"related to the lack of IT security policies and procedures." These types of deficiencies continued 
to plague the agency even up to FY 2014. 30 
It should come as no surprise that as the agency was not enforcing a standard set of protocol for 
its contractors, it was also failing to implement a coherent set of security protocol and measures 
within its own systems. 
In written testimony, Assistant Inspector General Michael R. Esser from the IOG of OPM 
discussed three key issues with OPM's IT security. The first weakness identified was 
information security governance, which is the management structure and foundation of an IT 
security program. Until FY 2012 OPM was using a decentralized governing structure for its IT 
security. This decentralization is one the factors that led to there being OPM data held 
throughout thousands of different data centers including DOI. Decentralization was considered a 
material weakness until FY 2014 when it was upgraded to a "significant weakness" due to the 
efforts of the agency to centralize control. Although it is clear that the agency was progressing 
toward a better security environment, years of decentralized and poorly monitored security 
systems contributed to the weaknesses in the system.31 
The second area of concern according to Esser was security assessment and 
authorization. Security assessment and authorization ensures that all IT systems meet a specified 
security standard before being allowed to operate in an agency 's technical environment. Again 
OPM had a history of poor performance in this area. Audits detected a weakness in OPM 
30 Esser, Michael. Statement to the House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
OPM: Data Breach, Hearing, June 16, 2015. Available at: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Esser-OPM-OIG-Statement-6-16-Data-Breach. pdf. 
31 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
16 
authorization dating back to FY 2010. Although the concern was alleviated enough to be 
dropped from audit FY 2012, the issue had resumed by FY 2014. In FY 2014, 11 out of 47 
systems were operating without assessment and authorization. More concerning is the fact that 
each of those 11 systems were supposed to undergo reassessment in FY 2014 but did not. 
Experts claim that some of these systems operating without authorization were some of the most 
critical systems in operation. This constitutes one of the most significant weaknesses in the OPM 
. k 32 secunty networ . 
The third and final area of concern was technical security controls. This broad area 
revealed a host of deficiencies in the agency systems. The most concerning issue the agency was 
facing was the lack of a comprehensive list of all databases and servers that exist within the 
OPM network. It is impossible to secure assets that the agency doesn't even know to exist. This 
issue relates to the lack of centralization of security in the agency, and presents a terrible 
weakness that could be exploited.33 
Along with the lack of a comprehensive list of assets operating on the OPM network, 
many of the controls in place to protect the OPM network were not properly functioning. The 
agency was performing vulnerability scans on its known computers and assets, but many 
computers were never scanned. Other scans that did take place were not properly executed due to 
a lack of proper credentials. In fact , many of the agency's tools were not functioning to their 
fullest capability. 34 
32 ibid 
33 ibid 
34 OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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Along with these perennial concerns, other system deficiencies were identified and 
reported during congressional hearings. Data encryption is an industry best practice for securing 
data, but it came to light during testimony that much, if not all, the data that was removed from 
OPM systems was entirely unencrypted. When pressured about why this basic security feature 
was not in use for all data in OPM systems, Director Archuleta responded that many of the 
systems in use at OPM are legacy systems, systems that are out of date. Because these systems 
are older it can be difficult if not impossible to utilize encryption on data in these systems. This 
has been a known problem in government agencies for years, but the rate of technological 
growth and the increasing cost of technology equipment make it difficult for agencies to keep up 
with the industry .35 
It would be unfair to assume that OPM was not trying to address its numerous security 
issues. OPM is continuing to work on the process of centralizing their assets in an effort to better 
protect them. They have also attempted to instill a protocol for addressing security incidents and 
incident management. They have had to concentrate on securing their most crucial networks first 
before they can move on to the rest of their networks. This process is well under way according 
to witnesses at congressional hearings.36 
OPM has been working closely with DHS in order to bolster their security controls. The 
federal government has used DHS to help distribute security systems that will monitor and 
protect agency networks . As these tools are implemented and correctly used, this will help to 
remedy the failures OPM was experiencing with scanning and monitoring their networks. 37 
35 Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, I 14th Cong. 




Encryption and legacy computers continue to be an interesting topic of debate. It is clear 
in this situation that encryption would not have protected the data because the hackers were 
moving through the network with an authorized credential.38 It is a concern that this information 
was not encrypted in the first place. OPM will need to be more aggressive with its replacement 
and improvement of out of date technology. This is one of the reasons OPM has requested an 
addition 21 million dollars for FY2016 in order to complete a data modernization project it 
started in 2014. 39 This will help to update OPM systems and hopefully bring them at least to the 
point they can be encrypted. 
The Federal Government 
Along with the failures of the contractors and agency, there is some blame to be placed 
on overall federal security measures in place. The federal government has established four roles 
for DHS in federal cybersecurity. The first role is to provide a common set of security 
capabilities as a baseline defense for federal agencies . This is done in the form of two programs, 
EINSTEIN and Continual Diagnostics and Monitoring (CDM). Second, they motivate agencies 
to implement security best practices and measure how well each agency does this. Third, DHS 
serves as an information hub for information sharing. Fourth, DHS provides incident response to 
agencies or contractors that suffer and incident or intrusion.40 
In accordance with the first task, DHS develops and deploys EINSTEIN for agency 
implementation. EINSTEIN is a perimeter defense focused on identifying threats before they 
38 ibid 
39 OPM Information Technology Spending & Data Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee 
on Financial Services and General Government, United States Senate, 114th Cong. (2015). 40 Ozment, Andy. Statement to the United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach, Hearing, 
June 25, 2015. Available at: file :// /U sers/Michael/Downloads/Testimony-Ozment-2015-06-
25%20(3 ). pdf 
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enter the system. There are currently three iterations of the EINSTEIN program, and each is in 
different stages of deployment. 
EINSTEIN 1, the first iteration, is capable of monitoring network traffic as it operates on 
the system. It also has the capability of identifying inconsistencies or anomalies in the traffic 
within the network. The second iteration, EINSTEIN 2, created the ability to detect known 
malicious activity as it enters the network and sounds an alarm. This does not stop the malicious 
threat from entering, but it will create an alert to let officials know the threat is present. These 
versions of EINSTEIN were in place when the breach happened. 41 
Dr. Ozment uses a description of a physical federal facility to help describe the function 
of these programs. EINSTEIN 1 is similar to camera at the entrance of the facility. It records all 
traffic on the road and can identify anomalies in traffic patterns. EINSTEIN 2 adds the ability of 
using a watch list to identify suspicious cars among the other traffic . It cannot stop suspicious 
vehicles, but it can create an alert that will notify security officials of the suspicious vehicle. 42 
EINSTEIN 3A is the newest iteration of this system. EINSTEIN 3A has the capability to 
not only monitor traffic in the network, but also to prohibit known malicious traffic from 
entering. This new phase uses classified as well as unclassified information to screen network 
traffic. Previous versions were incapable of accessing classified information. This new iteration 
is already working in 15 different agencies that covers about 45% of civilian government. 
Although this technology was not available to OPM at the time of the breach, it was scheduled to 
be available by the end of FY 2016. 
41 OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015). 
42 ibid 
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Returning to Ozment' s analogy with the government facility , EINSTEIN 3A would be 
similar to a guard post. It compares all vehicles against a classified watch list and prevents 
entrance if the vehicle matches a description from the watch list. This is the first version that 
actively stops known malicious traffic from enter the networks. 43 
It is obvious that because EINSTEIN is a perimeter only defense, that it is necessary to 
provide another layer of defense. DHS has created Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 
(CDM) program to complement EINSTEIN. Where EINSTEIN is a perimeter defense, CDM 
helps to monitor inside the network. In its first phase, CDM is focused on endpoint integrity. In 
phases 2 and 3, will eventually include identity and infrastructure management.44 
Agencies are able to improve their diagnostic capabilities through the tools provided by 
CDM. These tools allow the agencies to increase their network sensor capacity and allowing 
them to prioritize potential threats and weaknesses. The process has six steps. The first step is for 
agencies to install sensors within their network. Once the sensors are installed, they can be used 
to scan for known cyber flaws . The information from the scans is then syphoned into a bank with 
the results from scans of other agencies and departments. Reports are compiled utilizing a 
prioritized list of issues for each specific agency. The agency is then capable of assessing and 
addressing each known weakness with available resources. This helps allocate resources more 
efficiently. The final step is for the agency to report back on the results of their progress in 
correcting security problems, promoting situational awareness throughout the entire federal 
government. 45 
43 ibid 
44 "Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)." Homeland Security. November 06, 2015. 
Accessed May 05, 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/cdm#. 
45 ibid 
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To return to the analogy one last time, CDM Phase 1 allows agencies to continuously 
monitor door locks and security cameras to make sure they are operating correctly. Planned 
future versions, Phase 2 and 3, will monitor employees to make sure they are not engaged in 
unusual or malicious activity and monitor activity across the entire facility to detect any unusual 
patterns.46 
At the time of the congressional hearing on the OPM data breach, CDM was available for 
eight government agencies comprising approximately 50 percent of the federal government. It 
was the goal then to cover 97% of federal agencies at the time, and the end of FY 2015 had 
successfully met that goal. The new goal for DHS is to provide 100% CDM coverage by the end 
of FY 2016.47 
Even with these two programs in place, it is necessary for the agencies to supplement 
these measures with further layers of security that are customized to their needs. These are just 
the basic levels provided by DHS. It is clear that the programs are progressing in development 
and deployment, but not having these systems in place and the time it takes to further 
development will always be a weakness for federal security concerns. 
Preventing Future Breaches 
The information provided so far regarding the OPM data breach and the weaknesses in 
government cybersecurity paint a grim picture. There is no single program that can defend 
against all attacks, so agencies must rely on multiple layers of protection and security to try to 
prevent as many intrusions as possible. Many security programs are have simply accepted that 
46 OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015). 47 ibid 
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intrusions will happen and focus more on removing intruders as quickly as possible from the 
system. The truth is that it will likely only get worse. 
Attacks on data systems containing federal information have steadily increased over the 
past decade. From 2013-2014, attacks on federal information increased 10-15%. This is coupled 
with the fact that experts estimate that the number of attacks overall has increased more than 
1000% percent over the last 9 years and will continue to increase in coming years. These attacks 
will continue to test adjustments that are made in an attempt to make data more secure.48 
It is true these estimates must be tempered by technological factors. Increased conversion 
from paper to electronic documents means that there are more data systems to suffer attacks, and 
more information online that can be accessed. Another factor is that detection and identification 
systems have steadily increased meaning more attacks are being counted in the overall numbers . 
Attacks that had previously gone unidentified and therefore uncounted are now detected by 
stronger security systems. Even taking these into account, it the number of attacks is still rising 
as the technology to facilitate hacking attempts becomes more widespread. 49 
It seems that cybersecurity has become a race to employ new defenses more quickly than 
attackers can develop new ways of attacking. This race is highly dependent on funding and may 
hinge upon which group will devote the most resources . If the United States is not will to heavily 
invest in IT security, attackers will eventually find more ways to gain access to sensitive 
information. 
Chronic underfunding has been blamed for many of the security deficiencies government 
agencies are facing even though the federal government spends approximately $82 billion each 
48 Enhancing Cybersecurity of Third-Party Contractors and Vendors: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, 
114th Cong. (2015) . 
49 ibid 
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year on IT. 50 Witnesses in a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Financial Services and General Government stated that underfunding began in the 1990s, and it 
was that underfunding that led to many of the problems OPM and other agencies are facing 
today. One example of this is the decentralized data centers. Experts claim there are thousands of 
these centers all across federal networks. This type of architecture is difficult to secure because 
data centers are constantly being found outside the security net. 51 The federal government must 
take steps to ensure that it is devoting enough resources to evolve with the fast growing trends of 
technology. 
Even when funds are devoted to IT, acquisitions within the federal government are often 
too slow to provide timely assistance. The DHS CDM program took more than two years to 
accomplish Phase 1.52 This is a long time to leave agencies waiting for support in defending their 
systems. The same problems persist in updating older equipment and servers. These purchases 
are often too little too late, and the government never gets ahead of attackers. 
Devoting resources to cybersecurity is often difficult for lawmakers to do. Because most 
people do not understand the technical language of cybersecurity, they are not willing to impart 
the necessary funds to ensure it is effective. It is easy for people to see the needs of soldiers 
serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. Anyone can understand why he or she would need an armor 
plated vehicle or bulletproof vest, but it is a different story when agencies ask for more money 
for segmentation or multi-factored authentication. 
If the federal government truly wants to make cybersecurity a priority as it has claimed, it 
is going to have to implement a more aggressive strategy . This means not only devoting more 
50 OPM Information Technology Spending & Data Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee 
on Financial Services and General Government, United States Senate, 114th Cong. (2015). 51 ibid 
52 ibid 
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resources to IT, but also drafting new legislation that fast tracks implementation of new security 
programs and technology updates. The Whitehouse budget for FY201 7 would suggest that IT 
experts have been heard as they continue to beg for more money. The budget that will be 
submitted to Congress contains a 35% increase from the budget approved last year. 53 This is a 
step in the right direction toward securing America' s government network. 
53 Miller, Jason. "White House to Request 35 Percent Increase for Cyber in 2017." Federal News 




Reflective Writing- 924 words 
Completing this capstone project has been a culmination to my undergraduate experience. 
It has been a microcosm of nearly all the experiences I have had throughout my time at 
Utah State. There have been frustrations along with successes, and in the end, I am happy 
to have completed this project. 
For future honors students intending to complete this process, I would suggest 
getting an earlier start on the project. I began the project in my final semester, and as a 
result, much of the experience was blanketed will the stress of looming deadlines rather 
than a holistic and pleasant experience. I imagine there will always be a fair it of stress in 
completing a chore such as this. 
Particularly planning a time to present my project became an issue as I was trying 
to visit potential graduate schools. For any students that are trying to make the jump 
directly into graduate school, this can compound the stress of trying to complete the 
capstone requirements. It would have been better to either have been further along in the 
process or even finished while I was trying to make important decisions about my future. 
Another benefit to starting the project earlier is that students will be able to 
address topics that they truly wish to address. Rather than being bound by time 
restrictions and an internship, students ought to put themselves in a situation to freely 
choose a subject in which they want to gain some further expertise. It can be laborious to 
research a topic that does not compel or emotionally charge a project. 
Having a meaningful internship helped to ease the process of making the decision 
what to research for my capstone project. My time in Washington D.C. with VMware 
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was structured around much of the material that was discussed in my project, and I had a 
solid foundation of knowledge to build on moving forward. This may not always be the 
case for students completing internships, but obviously it is important to carefully select 
an internship on which to base a final project. 
I decided to continue researching the OPM data breach not only because I worked 
on it during my internship, but also because of the lack of general knowledge that my 
friends and associates seem to have about the event. When I referenced the OPM breach, 
I was often questioned as to what it even was. I think it is important for citizens to be 
aware of such monumental incidents that happen and affect so many Americans. 
Along with my concern for the lack of knowledge about the incident, I personally 
was a victim of the OPM data breach. My information was taken during the breach of 
Department oflnterior. I worked for the Forest Service as an eighteen-year-old fighting 
wild land fires , and because my information was in the federal system, it was at risk 
during the breach. As a result, I have identity theft insurance through the government, but 
I was curious exactly how my information was taken when I have not worked for the 
government in nearly seven years. I am sure there are others that feel the same way that I 
do, confused and unnerved at the situation 
There was an initial struggle with this project due to the lack of relevant scholarly 
articles. It made the process of tracking down information about the data breach 
particularly challenging. Along with the lack of scholarly material, much of the detailed 
information about the OPM data breach is confidential. This added an extra element of 
difficulty in presenting the material readers would need in order to gain a complete full 
understanding out the event. 
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In the end, using congressional transcripts for the majority of my research lent an 
element of authenticity to the information that was presented. Although the members of 
Congress were privy to more information behind closed doors, this was a conglomeration 
of much of the information Congress had while making decision about how to respond to 
the OPM breach. 
It was also convenient to use transcripts because I was able to attend many of the 
hearings referenced in the text as a part of my internship experience. It was a great 
benefit to be able to use information that I had some background with in compiling the 
research to complete this task. The research provided a unique and beneficial 
complement to my overall internship experience. 
The completion of this project has been nearly the only interaction I have had 
with the university program. This isolation from the program has been the source of some 
confusion about the project, requirements, and timelines. It would have been beneficial to 
be more involved with the honors program throughout my time at Utah State in order to 
take advantage of the resources they offer. 
Although a large portion of the responsibility in completing a capstone or thesis 
project falls on the student, there is a compelling incentive for the honors program to try 
to help more people through the final capstone process. There are at least a dozen of my 
classmates and associates that are clearly honors students and exceptional academics that 
have chosen not to complete this project for one reason or another. Not having these 
students as a part of the honors network is a disservice not only to them, but also to the 
students that do take the requisite steps to graduate with honors . It is my hope that honors 
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would seek out and encourage the best minds at Utah State to graduate with honors and 
join the alumni base. 
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